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Proposed Relevancy Rules
Generally Restate Law
Logically, any code of evidence should start with general rules
stating what evidence is admissible and what evidence is inadmis-
sible, and then proceed to the special rules which may further cir-
cumscribe this general rule. This method of organization is fol-
lowed by the Proposed Nebraska Rules of Evidence (hereinafter
"Nebraska Rule[s]," "Nebraska proposal" or "Rule[s]") and the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter "Federal Rule[s]"
or "federal proposal"). Article IV of both these proposals defines
generally this concept of admissibility in Rule 402, which provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise pro-
vided by the Constitution of the United States or the State of Ne-
braska, by Act of Congress or of the Legislature of the State of
Nebraska, by these rules, or by other rules adopted by the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
The more specific definition of admissibility for each proposal
is set forth in Rule 401, which provides:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the de-
termination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
The proposals' emphasis on the word "relevant" in these admis-
sibility provisions can be traced back at least to the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Evidence (hereinafter "Model Code")
which was first published in 1942. The Model Code's Rule 1(12)
defined "relevant evidence" to mean "evidence having any tend-
ency in reason to prove any material matter ... ." And in Rule
1(8) "material matter" was defined to mean "a matter, the exist-
ence or non-existence of which is provable in the action." Rule
9(f) of the Model Code stated that all relevant evidence is admis-
* J.D. cum laude 1953, Creighton University. Member Nebraska Bar
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sible, and Rule 10 provided that "[s]ubject to Rule 3, each Rule
stating that evidence is admissible contains by implication the pro-
vision, 'if relevant and not subject to exclusion by another of these
Rules.'
The Model Code's forword, written by Professor Edmund M.
Morgan, stated:
The Code of Evidence therefore proceeds upon the theory that
it is to be administered by an honest and intelligent judge; and
that the trier of fact, whether or not a jury, has the capacity and
desire to hear, consider and fairly evaluate all data which reason-
able men would use if confronted with the necessity of solving
a problem of like importance in their everyday life.
Admissibility of Relevant Evidence
How much weight shall be given to evidence is a question ofjudgment incapable of a priori determination. The Anglo-Ameri-
can law has, as Professor Thayer has said, no mandate to the log-
ical faculty. It does, in a few instances, refuse to receive one class
of evidence where an obviously better one is available; but it al-
ways concerns itself with admissibility as distinguished from
weight. In any rational inquiry, logically irrelevant evidence is
excluded, and in judicial inquiries some logically relevant material
may be either absolutely or conditionally rejected. A code of evi-
dence should concern itself primarily with admissibility, and in
this respect it should be complete in itself. Consequently it
should begin with a sweeping declaration that all relevant evi-
dence is admissible, that no person is incompetent as a witness
and that there is no privilege to refuse to be a witness or to dis-
close relevant matter or to prevent another from disclosing it.
Then it should set up specific exceptions to this fundamental rule.
The Code follows this plan.'
Actually, this approach predates the Model Code. Professor
Thayer, in his 1898 Treatise on Evidence,2 recognized that the two
fundamental principles of the law of evidence are: (1) that, unless
excluded by some rule or principle of law, all that is logically pro-
bative is admissible; and (2) that which is not logically probative
is irrelevant and not admissible. Thayer pointed out that there
are many exceptions and qualifications to the rule that whatever
is logically relevant is admissible; some things are rejected as being
of too slight a significance or having too conjectural and remote
a connection, and other evidence is dangerous in the effect it may
have on the jury and in the possibility it would be misused or
overestimated by the jury.
1. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE 10-11 (1942).
2. J. THAYER, A PRELnINARY TREATSE ON EVIDENcE AT THE COMMON
LAw 264-66 (1898).
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A clear and simple statement of these concepts of admissibility
is the following from Professor McCormick:
Relevance, as we shall see, is probative worth, and common
sense would suggest that if there is to be any practice of exclud-
ing evidence which is offered, the first ground of exclusion should
be the want of probative value. Correspondingly, in the search
for the truth of the issue, reason would suggest that if evidence
is logically probative it should be received unless there is some
distinct ground for refusing to hear it.
We start, then, with the notion of materiality, the inclusion of
certain questions or propositions within the range of allowable
controversy in the lawsuit. Relevancy, in legal usage, embraces
this test and something more. Relevancy in logic is the tendency
of evidence to establish a proposition which it is offered to
prove. Relevancy, as employed by judges and lawyers, is the
tendency of the evidence to establish a material proposition.
Thus, as James points out, "evidence may be excluded as 'irrele-
vant' for either of these two quite distinct reasons: because it is
not probative of the proposition at which it is directed, or because
that proposition is not probable in the case."
What is the standard of relevance or probative quality which
evidence must meet if it is to be admitted? We have said that
it must "tend to establish" the inference for which it is offered.
: . . It is believed . . . that the most acceptable test of relevancy
is the question, does the evidence offered render the desired infer-
ence more probable than it would be without the evidence? There
are other formulas of relevancy found in the opinions which
though expressed in more general terms seem consistent with the
test suggested.3
The proposed Rules 401 and 402, with respect to the definition
of relevancy and admissibility of relevant evidence, may appear
very broad, but these rules merely restate present Nebraska law.
That the rules are a mere restatement is apparent from the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's decision in Rickertsen v. Carskadon.4 In
Rickertsen, the court held the rule to be that a fact must be ad-
mitted when it has an "actual and substantial tendency" to estab-
lish or disprove the fact being litigated.5 Furthermore, the court
said evidence is relevant "not only when it tends to prove or dis-
prove the precise fact in issue, but when it tends to establish a
fact from which the existence or nonexistence of the fact in issue
can be directly inferred."
3. C. McCoRmwcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or EvWDxxcX 314-18 (1st ed.
1954).
4. 169 Neb. 744, 100 N.W.2d 852 (1960).
5. Id. at 749, 100 N.W.2d at 856 (citations omitted).
6. Id.
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Of course, even though evidence may be relevant, it may be
excluded where its probative value is outweighed by other factors.
As Professor McCormick has pointed out:
It may be asked, how does the judge know whether the evidence
does make more probable the truth of the fact to be inferred? ...
The answer must filter through the judge's experience, his judg-
ment, and his knowledge of human conduct and motivation....
Relevant evidence, then, is evidence that in some degree ad-
vances the inquiry, and thus has probative value, and is prima
facie admissible. But relevance is not always enough. There may
remain the question, is its value worth what it costs? There are
several counterbalancing factors which may move the court to ex-
clude relevant circumstantial evidence if they outweigh its proba-
tive value. In order of their importance, they are these. First,
the danger that the facts offered may unduly arouse the jury's
emotions of prejudice, hostility or sympathy. Second, the proba-
bility that the proof and the answering evidence that it provokes
may create a side-issue that will unduly distract the jury from
the main issues. Third, the likelihood that the evidence offered
and the counter-proof will consume an undue amount of time.
Fourth, the danger of unfair surprise to the opponent when, having
no reasonable ground to anticipate this developement [sic] of the
proof, he would be unprepared to meet it. Often, of course, sev-
eral of these dangers such as distraction and time-consumption, or
prejudice and surprise, emerge from a particular offer of evidence.
This balancing of intangibles-probative values against probative
dangers-is so much a matter where wise judges in particular situ-
ations may differ that a lee-way of discretion is generally recog-
nized.7
In recognition of these policies, Proposed Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
eration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Rule 403 reflects Nebraska law as stated in Meyer v. Moe1U8
which held that the admission of collateral or cumulative evidence
rested within the court's sound discretion. Recently, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States
v. Ravich9 recognized this discretionary role in determining admis-
sibility. Ravich, charged with bank robbery, complained of the ad-
mission in evidence of two .38 caliber pistols and a box of .38 cali-
ber ammunition found in the trunk of the car of one of the de-
fendants at the time of arrest as well as cash found in defendant's
7. C. McCoRMvcK, HANI BoOK OF THE LAW OF EViDENcE 318-20 (1st ed.
1954).
8. 186 Neb. 397, 183 N.W.2d 480 (1971).
9. 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1970).
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possession and .38 caliber pistols and additional cash found in Ra-
vich's motel room. In affirming the conviction, Judge Friendly
wrote:
While Wigmore considered that legal relevancy denotes "some-
thing more than a minimum of probative value" he made clear
that evidence "does not need to involve demonstration or to pro-
duce persuasion by its sole and intrinsic force, but merely to be
worth consideration by the jury." Others have taken an even
more generous view. The trial judge must weigh the probative
value of the evidence against its tendency to create unfair preju-
dice and his determination will rarely be disturbed on appeal.
The guns and ammunition stand on a somewhat different foot-
ing. The evidence connecting the guns seized in Louisiana with
those used in the robbery was rather attenuated. Indeed, since
only three guns were used in the robbery it is perfectly plain that
at least half of the proffered weapons were not used there.
Nevertheless, a jury could infer from the possession of a large
number of guns at the date of arrest that at least some of them
had been possessed for a substantial period of time, and therefore
that the defendants had possessed guns on and before the date of
the robbery. Direct evidence of such possession would have been
relevant to establish opportunity or preparation to commit the
crime charged, and thus would have tended to prove the identity
of the robbers, the only real issue in this trial. Circumstantial
evidence of such possession was therefore also relevant.
Notwithstanding the relevance of the guns and the ammunition,
the trial judge would have been justified in excluding them if he
decided that their probative value was outweighed by their ten-
dency to confuse the issues or inflame the jury. He might well
have done so in this case, in view of the overwhelming evidence
that the defendants were the robbers, the rather small addition
which the guns provided, and the undoubted effect on the jury
of seeing all this hardware on the table. However, the trial judge
has wide discretion in this area, and we do not find that it was
abused here.10
A sixth circuit decision similarly recognized this discretionary
role and cited proposed Rule 403. In Olin-Mathieson Chemical
Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.," Olin sued a manufac-
turer of heavy electrical equipment for property damages in June
1968 caused by an equipment malfunction. During trial, Olin un-
successfully tried to introduce evidence of a similar equipment mal-
function in November 1968. There were some marked contrasts
in the two incidents. In affirming the trial court's ruling exclud-
ing such evidence, Judge Peck stated:
10. Id. at 1203-05 (citations omitted) (original emphasis). See also State
v. Huerta, 191 Neb. 280, - N.W.2d -(1974).
11. 438 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971).
370 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 3 (1974)
Under federal law, we can find no authorities supporting the
contention of Olin-Mathieson that the trial judge was required to
admit the evidence in question. There can be no doubt that Rule
43(a) envisions a greater leniency toward the admissibility of evi-
dence, which this court has recognized. However, this court also
vests the trial judge with broad discretion over the admissibility
of evidence, especially where the case is tried before a jury.
Reference to the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates seems appropriate. Rule
4-03 thereof states:
"Rule 4-03, Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time.
(a) Exclusion Mandatory. Although relevant, evidence
is not admissible if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of
the issues, or of misleading of the jury."
The rule makes exclusion of evidence such as that in the present
case not merely discretionary, but mandatory. The note under the
rule explains that the probative value of evidence must be
weighed against the harm likely to result from its admission. It
was within the spirit of this section that the trial judge made his
ruling, and we find no error in his decision.12
A comparison of Article IV of the Nebraska proposal with the
-federal proposal reveals they are substantially identical. The
United States House of Representatives recently passed H.R. 5463
which makes some changes in the federal proposal. Most of these
changes were suggested by the Committee on the Judiciary. So
far as Article IV is concerned, the following changes are the only
significant ones.
The House modified Rule 402 to limit the Supreme Court's
power to promulgate rules of evidence to "rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to Statutory Authority." Thus, the rule
as modified, together with the subcommittee note, now reads:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise pro-
vided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Con-
gress, by these rules, or by other rules [adopted] prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
Subcommittee Note
To accommodate the view that the Congress should not acqui-
esce in the Court's judgment that it has authority under the exist-
ing Rules Enabling Acts to promulgate Rules of Evidence, and the
concern that the Congress must not affect adversely whatever au-
thority the Court does have to promulgate rules, the Subcommittee
amended "by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court" to read
12. Id. at 838-39.
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"by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to stat-
utory authority" in this and other rules where the reference ap-
pears.
Rule 406 was modified by striking subparagraph (b). The sub-
committee note explaining this change states:
The subheading "(a) Admissibility" was dropped from the
Rule for purposes of consistency of style in view of the Subcom-
mittee's deletion of subsection (b).
The Subcommittee was also of the view that the method of
proof of habit and routine practice should be left to the courts
on a case by case basis and so struck out subdivision (b).
And Rule 408 was modified so that it now reads:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish,
or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable con-
sideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim
which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admis-
sible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.
Evidence of [conduct or statements made in] admissions of liabil-
ity or opinions given during compromise negotiations is likewise
not admissible. Evidence of facts disclosed during compromise
negotiations, however, is not inadmissible by virtue of having been
first disclosed in those negotiations. This rule does not require
exclusion when [the] evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations is offered for another purpose, such as
proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investiga-
tion or prosecution.
The parts in brackets were stricken and the parts in italics were
substituted for the former language. The subcommittee's note ac-
companying this Rule 408 modification explains:
Under existing federal law evidence of conduct and statements
made in compromise negotiations is admissible in litigation. The
second sentence of the Court draft proposed to reverse that doc-
trine in the interest of further promoting non-judicial settlement
of disputes. Some agencies of Government expressed the view
that the Court formulation of the rule was likely to impede com-
promise negotiations. They were fearful that parties dealing with
government agencies would be reluctant to furnish information at
preliminary meetings and would wait until formal compromise
negotiations began, thus effecting an immunity for themselves
with respect to the evidence supplied. Under the rule as recast
by the Subcommittee admissions of liability or opinions given dur-
ing compromise negotiations continue inadmissible, but evidence
of facts is admissible. The latter aspect of the rule is drafted so
as to preserve, however, other possible objections to the introduc-
tion of such evidence. The Subcommittee also intends no change
in the present law whereby a party may protect himself from the
future use of his statements by couching them in hypothetical or
conditional form, such as "Let us assume for purposes of the dis-
cussion that" or "If it were the case that."
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Presumably, these changes will be included in the Nebraska
Proposal before it is submitted to the Nebraska Legislature. Only
the adoption of Rules 405 (a) and 408 would change existing Ne-
braska law. The House modifications in H.R. 5463 to those two
rules does not alter that fact.
With both the federal proposal and the Nebraska proposal there
has been a great amount of study and work. All members of the
bar have a responsibility to review critically these proposed rules
and make recommendations which they feel would either clarify
or improve them in order that the rules can move towards prompt
adoption by the Nebraska Legislature.
